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O. Introduction 
This paper is mainly concerned with tense in embedded constructions. I 
believe that recent research - notably the work by Ogihara ( 1 989) and Abusch 
(1993) - has contributed much to our better understanding of its semantics. The 
proposals made by the two authors are, however, still too simplistic in some 
regards. Among other things, they neglect the interplay of tense with temporal 
adverbs of quantification and with frame-setters. To get this composition right is a 
touchstone for every theory of tense and tense semanticists have been concerned 
with this problem from the beginning on, as witnessed by the analyses in Kratzer 
(1978), Bauerle (1979), Dowty (197911982), to mention a few. 
The claim I want to stress in this article is that in complements of attitudes, 
we can never have a "referential " tense, i. e. ,  an absolute or anaphorical tense. 
Every tense occurring there will tum out to be a bound tense. I think this claim is 
implicit in Ogihara's (1989) analysis, and it is made explicit in Abusch's (1993) 
approach. The composition of bound tense with the two kinds of adverbs 
mentioned will require rather elaborate techniques and I am not sure whether I have 
been entirely successful, but I hope that the solution is basically correct. 
1. The iconic tradition 
Last year I had the honour of organizing a wotkshop on 1he syntax/semantic 
inteIface at the summer school in Copenhagen. Some speakers used the so-called 
Reichenbach theory and thought that the semantic contributions of tense could be 
made clear by drawing pictures in the style of Reichenbach's (1947) celebrated 
short passage on tense. And that would be all there is to do. Having been the 
organizer of the workshop, I didn't dare to criticize the method. But I feel that I 
have to do it at least once in my life: 1he method is not only imprecise, it sometimes 
gives us the wrong idea of what is going on. Here is a first application: 
(1 -1)  a .  Vashek was funny 
b. -------------- 1--------- 1------------> 
E,R S 
Sentence (l-la) is represented by 1he diagram (1- 1b), in which the vector represents 
the flow of time, S is the speech time, R is the reference time (whatever that may 
be) and E is the event time. 
The pluperfect sentence (l -2a) is represented by the situation (1-2b). 
( 1 -2) a. Vashek had been funny 
b. -----1------1------1--------> 
E R S 
The idea, of course, is that these situations directly reflect the semantics of the 
tenses which the verbs of the sentences have. Thus, the sentences may be analysed 
as (1-3Xa) and (b) respectively: 
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(1-3) a. PAST Vashek be fmmy 
b. PAST PERF Vashek be funny 
The diagrams tell us that PAST brings us from S to R and PERF brings us from R 
to E. Since ( 1-3a) has no PERFect operator, E and R coincide. 
All this is nice and suggestive, but it is no semantics. One realizes that as 
soon as one tries to write that down. Any straightforward formalization is wrong, 
and there is, of course, a lot of literature trying to make the un derlying 
intuitions precise. 
Consider a quantificational approach which is developed in the writings of 
Arthur Prior and is used by Richard Montague. If we use two time parameters, the 
speech time S and the intensional time t, which can be shifted by tense operators, 
we can state the interpretation rules for PAST and PERF as (I-4)(a) and (b) 
respectively: 
(1-4) A quantificational approach 
a. I PASTa liS,. = 1 iff 3t': t' < S & l a llst = 1 .  
b .  I PERF a liS" = 1 iff 3t': t' < t & la list = 1 .  
The rules correctly capture that PAST is a deictic or absolute tense, whereas PERF 
depends on the intensional parameter only. Never mind how these sentential 
operators can be reconciled with the requirements of surface syntax, where tenses 
seem to be verb modifiers and not sentential adverbs: the problematic aspect of the 
formalizations is that tenses are interpreted as existential quantifiers. This creates 
problems as soon as we regard the interaction of tense with negation, as has been 
noticed by Partee (1973): 
(1-5) I didn't turn the stove off 
We can formalize this as ( 1-6a) or ( 1-6b), where the first expresses a state of affairs 
that is presumably false and the second one that is 1rivially true. 
(1-6) a. -,PAST I turn off the stove 
b. PAST -, I turn off the stove 
Neither can be correct. 
Another problem, which is the starting point for Rainer Bauerle's (1979) 
dissertation, has to do with the combination of tenses with temporal adverbs of 
quantification. 
( 1 -7) Today, Vashek was always funny 
Intuitively, it is quite clear what the truth conditions of (7) are, and they can be 
depicted by diagram (1-8): 
(1-8) r-- today " 
---? --- 1/1/11111/11------?-----------I--------> 
S 
The slashed interval is the time of the funniness. Vashek's funniness might extend 
further into the past and into the future, but the sentence does not give us any 
information about that. 
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If we try to formalize this, we hit trouble. The quantifier always cannot have 
wider scope than PAST because that would amount to vacuous quantification. 
Therefore it must quantify over the time that bas been shifted backwards by PAST. 
The semantics would then be something like (1-9): 
(1-9) I always a f" = 1 iff 'lit': If t' � t, then I a II$' = 1 .  
Thus, the formalization of our sentence would be (1 -lOa), whose truth conditions 
are stated under (I-lOb). ( I - tOc )  illustrates the scene described. 
(1- 10) a. today PAST always Vashek be funny 
b. 3t': t' � today & t' < S 
& Vt*(lf t* � t', then Vashek is funny at t*) 
, - today -
c. -----1-?--IIII--?--I---------------- I--------> 
S 
Never mind how the frame-setter today and the tense are brought together: the 
formalization is too weak anyway. If there is an interval of today at which Vasbek 
is always funny, this means that Vasbek is funny at some interval of today. Thus, 
the semantics predicts that sentence (1 -7) means the same as sentence (1-1 1 ), which 
is obviously wrong. We would immediately discover the difference if we negated 
the two.  
( 1 - 1 1 )  Today, Vasbek was funny [;t ( 1-7)] 
An even more puzzling problem, pointed out to me by Irene Heim, arises 
with the present tense, which a straightforward quantificational theory would 
analyse as: 
(1- 12) I PRES a Os" = I 3t': f overlaps S &  l a ll$' = 1 . 
The theory predicts that ( 1 - 13a) means ( 1 - 13b). This, however, is too weak. 
Vasbek does not bark only at one particular interval of today when the bell rings 
and which overlaps S. He barks at any belling-interval of today. 
(1-13) a. Today, Vashek always barks when the bell rings 
b. PREDICTED: 
I 
rwhen the bell rings, 1 r' . today PRES ah1,·ays l Vashek bark J II = 1 iff 
3t': t' � today & t' 0 S & 
Vt*(If 1* � t' & t* 0 S & the bell rings at t* , fuen Vasbek balks at 1*) 
c. WAN1ED: 
Vt(If t � today & the bell rings at t, fuen Vashek barks at t) 
("0" stands for the overlap relation.) The truth conditions are correctly described by 
the semiformal paraphrase (1- 13c), in which the information conveyed by PRES 
has mysteriously disappeared. 
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Partee's ( 1913) conclusion is that a simple-minded quantificational approach 
is problematic: tenses are more like pronouns. There are a number of supporters of 
this view, among whom En� ( 1987) is perhaps the best known} Instead of 
discussing this rather intricate proposal, let us look at a simpler variant, which is 
considered in Heim ( 1994). 
( 1 - 14) A referential approach 
a. I PRES; IF'S is defined only if g( i)o S . When defined, 
I PRES; irs = g( i) . 
b. I PAST'; rs is defined only if 1f... i) < S . When defined, 
I PAST'; rs = g( i) . 
If we try to apply this to example ( 1 - 13), we run into difficulties again. There are 
two options for interpreting always: the quantifier could quantify over present 
times. That would give us the meaning: "Vashek barks at every time which overlaps 
S and at which the bell rings". The second option is that always quantifies over 
subintervals of the time denoted by PRES. That would mean that Vashek barks at 
every subinterval of the present time at which the bell rings. Both interpretations are 
inadequate. 
Reichenbachian diagrams don't give us a clue as to how we could overcome 
these problems. But there seems to be nothing wrong with them. Sometimes, 
however, the pictures really bewitch our thinking. Look at ( 1-15): 
( 1- 15) a. Zuzana thinks that Vashek is asleep 
One could try to represent this so-called simultaneous reading by means of icon 
( I - 15b). 
( 1 - 15) b .  El , E2 
--------------------1--------------------------> 
R, S 
PREDICfION: El = E2 
El represents the time of the thinking and E2 is the time of Vashek's being asleep. 
Since all the parameters coincide, El should be identical to E2. This, however, is 
not so. We all are wrong about the time most of the time. Zuzana has her thought at 
5 o'clock, but she believes it is 6 o'clock. She thinks: "It's 6 o'clock and I bet that 
that lazy fellow Vashek is still asleep". We can describe the content of her thought 
as "being temporally located at a time which is 6 o'clock and at which Vashek is 
asleep" .  In other words, the time of Vashek's sleeping in the belief worlds is 6 
o'clock. Thus, El = 5 o'clock and E2 = 6 o'clock. So, obviously, EI :;t: E2. Or 
Zuzana might not have had any particular time in mind. She just thought: 
"Vashek is asleep right now".  The content of the thinking may be described as 
"being at a time at which Vashek is asleep".  This formulation makes it obvious once 
more that the time of the sleeping E2 has nothing to do with the time of the thinking 
El ·  
Or consider (1-16a): 
( 1 - 16) a. Zuzana thought that Vashek was asleep 
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This sentence has three different Reichenbach diagrams, which we contract into 
one: 
( 1 - 16) b .  E2 E2 E2 
-------------- 1------- 1-------- 1------1---------> 
El , R S 
PREDICTION: E2 < S 
One might argue that the approach correctly predicts that the time of the sleeping in 
the belief worlds E2 may be before, simultaneous to or after the time of the thinking 
E 1 , a result compatible with our previous reflection. Still, the semantics of the 
embedded PAST tells us that E2 is before S. And this is wrong again. The speech 
time is 5 o'clock. Zuzana had her thought at 4:45 and she thought that it was 5: 15 
and that Vashek was asleep. Thus, E2 > S. 
The consequence of this reflection is that the embedded tenses cannot be 
absolute tenses here. Since there is no relation between the time in the belief worlds 
and the time of the believing, the notion of relative tense doesn't make sense either 
if it is understood as expressing a relation between the evaluation time in the matrix 
clause and that in the subordinate clause. Thus, the traditional talk about 
simultaneity, anteriority or back-shifting and posteriority or forward-shifting has to 
be reinterpreted in a way that will become clear in the course of the discussion. All 
the more, it follows that there is no way of representing what is going on by means 
of Reichenbach diagrams. 
2. Bouud variable readings 
Let us forget adverbs of quantification for a while and discuss embedded 
constructions. What is going on here? I think that Barbara Partee's conjecture that 
tenses might be something like pronouns carries some truth. Bound pronouns 
behave like bound variables and so do bound tenses. 
This section will make it clear that the bound variable interpretation of 
embedded tense is a natural outcome of the semantics of attitudes. Bound variable 
tense will in fact be equivalent to tenselessness. I will give examples from the Latin 
Sequence of Tenses which show that embedded tensed forms must mean the same 
as their tenseless counterparts. 
Let us start with a logical analysis of sentence ( 1 - 16a). 1 will use an 
extensional typed language in the style of Gallin ( 1975), which makes the 
intensional parameters world (= type s) and time (= type i) explicit An approximate 
representation of the meaning of the sentence is: 
The crucial property of the formula is that there is no past tense in the complement 
of think. (I am assuming a Priorian semantics for PAST here.) Furthermore, the 
time and the world variables of the predicate are A.-bound and, in fact, abstracted 
away: we could write the complement of think equally well as asleep (Vashek) , 
i.e., as a formula which leaves the world and time argument unsaturated. 
Therefore, there is no semantic relation between the time of the thinking and the 
time of the sleeping. 
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The formula as such does not tell us why there should be no tense in the 
complement. A meaning rule for think provides the explanation, for it reveals that 
"Zuzana thinks in wo at tl " is a universal quantifier quantifying over world-time 
pairs: 
(2-2) I think IKP)(a)(t)(w) = 1 ifffor every w' and t' compatible with 
what a thinks in w at t, P(f )(w' ) = 1 .  
The rule assumes that think is of type {(i,st){e, (i,st)}) . The rule can be 
paraphrased as "a thinks that she is in a world at a time such that P is true in that 
world at that time". If the time parameter were linked to the speech time, the speech 
time would be part of Zuzana's thought. In section 1 we argued that this cannot be 
the case. Our formalization correctly implies that the content of thought is in no way 
related to the time in the real world. 
That there cannot be any tense information in embedded constructions is 
nicely illustrated by the Latin conseentio temporom: 
(2-3) a. Scio quem Susanna arnet 
I know whom Sue love (subjunctive present) 
a ' .  Scio Susannarn te arnare 
I know Sue you love 
b .  Scio quem Susanna arnaverit 
I know whom Sue have loved (subjunctive perfect) 
b ' .  Scio Susannarn te arnavisse 
I know Sue you have loved (infinitive perfect) 
c.  Scio quem Susanna amatura sit 
I know whom Sue loving-RIT be-SUBJ (subjunctive future) 
c ' .  Scio Susannam te amaturam esse 
I know Sue you lov-RIT be (infinitive future) 
The equations listed under (2-4) show that the finite verb forms mean exactly the 
same as their non-finite counterparts, which we get from the finite ones by deleting 
the tense. 
(2-4) Vstem + Pres + Subjunctive = Vstem 
Vstem + Perf + Pres + Subjunctive = Vstem + Perf 
Vstem + Future + Pres + Subjunctive = Vstem + Future 
The synopsis suggests that the subjunctive is somehow responsible for the tense 
deletion. Later on, I will risk a speculation as to what analysis could be given of the 
subjunctive in order to obtain this result 
The discussion supports the hypothesis that the complement of an attitude 
doesn't tolerate an absolute tense. 
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3. The syntax of bound tense 
If there cannot be absolute tense in certain intensional contexts but w e  
nevertheless find tense morphology there (for the simple reason that every finite 
verb is tensed), we are left with two options. Either we delete the tense in these 
contexts or we interpret tense differently in transparent and opaque contexts. The 
result has to be a bound time variable in each case. 
Among the approaches known to me, Ogihara ( 1989) is a deletion approach 
whereas Stowell ( 1993) is perhaps best understood as an approach of the other 
kind, although his system makes use of tense deletion in certain contexts as well, as 
we will see in section 5. Abusch ( 1993) tries to capture the bound readings by a 
complicated unified semantics, which I have discussed extensively elsewhere (cf. 
von Stechow 1994). 
So, let us consider Ogihara's deletion approach first. It would be very 
simple if it were just deletion in embedded clauses. But things are more complicated 
because not just any combination of matrix tense and embedded tense is acceptable, 
as we all know. Ogihara's rule is this: 
(3- 1) (Optional) Tense Deletion (Ogihara 1989, p. l09) 
Delete a tense 13 if a and 13 are occurrences of the same tense morpheme 
and a is the local tense of 13. 
[local = next c-commanding] 
Ogihara interprets deleted tense as relative present, an operation which has the effect 
that 0-tense always denotes the local evaluation time. I will come back to the 
semantics in a moment. The rule applies at LF after Quantifier Raising. The effect 
of Tense Deletion is that a present morpheme may trigger the deletion of any 
subordinate present morpheme, provided no past morpheme intervenes. Similarly, 
a past morpheme may trigger the deletion of any subordinate past morpheme if no 
present morpheme intervenes. 
Let us see the effect of the rule by applying it to some of the core data which 
motivated Ogihara's theory.2 
(3-2) a. A week ago he said that in ten days he would buy a fish that 
was still alive 
[was = bound variable] 
b. He will buy a fish that § alive3 
� = bound variable] 
c. He will buy a fish that � alive 
[was = relative past] 
The LFs explaining the data are roughly these, where I have indicated deleted tenses 
by the zero prefix: 
(3-3) a. PASTI he say J..o[that 0-PAST WOLL J..o[lNFo he buy a fish that 0-
PAST be alive]] 
b. PRESI WOLL J..o[INFO he buy a fish that 0-PRES be alive] 
c. PRESI WOLL J..o[INFo he buy a fish that 3z[PAST2 be alive)) 
The notation of the IF closely follows Heim ( 1994). In the article I will assume a 
TP dominating a VP. The subject is generated in SpecVP, the semantic tense 
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(PAST or PRES) is in SpecTP, and the tense morphology is in T, i.e., the TP­
head. The AgrP is ignored throughout. SpecTP is an argument of the verb. 
Infinitive phrases INF-P or participle phrases PART -P contain a temporal argument 
in the specifier, the variable to. The representation of the morphology is omitted in 
the text The LFs in this paper ignore the world parameter, which would have to be 
represented by the variable wO at the appropriate place. The formulas interpreting 
the LFs will, however, contain wo with the appropriate binding. 
The variable to is called the distinguished (time) variable and plays a 
special role in our system. If it is free, it denotes the speech time. A general 
syntactic convention is that operators shifting the time always do that via 
A.-abstraction over to. This will have the effect that each occurrence of to gives us 
the local evaluation time, i.e., the intensional time parameter of Montague's 
language IL. As will be seen in a moment, tenses may not be analysed as time 
shifters. 
Henceforth, I will use a relational semantics for tense which is similar to the 
Priorian one but which doesn't necessarily quantify over the time. The advantage of 
such an approach is that it allows for temporal anaphora. PASTi,O says that ti is 
before to. I will call Ii the reference time of PAST. to is the local evalnation 
time of PAST. Since it is always denoted by the distinguished variable, the second 
index is redundant and can be omitted. Hence, I write PASTi for PASTi,(). Similar 
conventions apply to PRES. As for WOIL, the stem underlying the auxiliaries will 
and would , for the time being it is interpreted as an indefinite relative future with 
respect to some given evaluation time. The analogue holds for HAVE. This is the 
content of the following meaning rules. 
(3-4) Tense and temporal auxiliaries (preliminary version) 
a. 0-PAST and 0-PRES are translated by the distinguished variable to ' 
b. PASTj and PRESi are translated as AP[ti < to " p(tJ] and utti 0 to " p( tJ] , respectively. 
c. WaLL and HA VB are translated as J..tJJ13f [I > t "  1'(1')] and 
J..tJ..P3t [I < t "  I'(t' )] , respectively. 
Condition (3-4a) is designed to capture Ogihara's interpretation of 0-tense as a 
relative present: a 0-tense is always c-commanded by an overt tense which applies 
to a t.o-abstract. The effect of this is that to is bound and denotes the reference 
time of the tense, i.e., the local evaluation time determined by the tense. The LFs 
can now be translated into the formulas (3-5)(a) to (c):4 
(3-5) 
{� \ 
a. t < t  " say I r rfish", lo (x) " alive", I (xm l  1 0 "'0'1 1 AloAwo3tlt > to " 3xl ° ( ) 0 0  J I I  , " buy tIIo" he ,x JJ 
Bound variable past in relative clause 
b. tI D to " 3t(t > t1 " 3x[fish",..(x) ,, alive",o' " buY",o,(he, x)] 
Bound variable present in relative clause 
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r ( fish .. ix) A 3t2 [t2 < t A alive "0'> (x)] \ 1 
c. t\ 0 to A 3tj t > t\ " 3xl J I 
l " buy .. ihe, x) J 
Relative past in relative clause 
I think these results are satisfactory. Notice, however, that Ogihara's rule does not 
mention intensional contexts. Thus, we have to add a condition that Tense Deletion 
applies obligatorily there. Furthermore, Abusch ( 1993) argues that Tense Deletion 
cannot apply in extensional contexts at all but has to be restricted to intensional 
contexts: 
(3-6) a. John met a woman being in the next room 
b. *John met a woman who was in the next room now 
She seems to think that the time variable of a verb with deleted tense may freely 
refer to any time whatsoever. For example (3-6b), the 0-tense of was could refer to 
the utterance time to according to Abusch. Thus, the two sentences would be 
synonymous, which they are not. 
It should be clear from the semantics introduced that such a criticism doesn't 
apply to this example: 0-tenses do not refer freely but denote the local evaluation 
time; hence their temporal reference is higbly restricted. Look at an LF for (3-6b) 
where Tense Deletion can apply: 
(3-6) c .  PASTl i.o[[a woman who 0-PAST be in the next room now]3 
TO John meet 131 
rwoman{x) 1\ in the next room.,." (x) " t\ b: nowl 
d .  t\ < to " 3xl J " meet ... " {John, x) 
The formula interpreting 0-PAST as the local evaluation time is (3-6d). Clearly, it 
is contradictory because the local evaluation time cannot precede to and be part of 
now, which is to. Thus, this example doesn't refute Ogihara's rule. 
A closer inspection of the example shows the following: if we delete PAST, 
we have to bind it if we want 0-PAST to be coreferential with the reference time 
denoted by the matrix PAST. This presupposes that the generalized quantifier 
PA ST 1 can shift the local evaluation time to via the abstractor Ao. This i s  
unobjectionable for this particular example but gives wrong results for cases like the 
following, which will be discussed in the next section. 
(3-7) a. Bill had a student that ought to study more 
b. PASTI i.o[[a student that ought() to study more]2 TO Bill have 12] 
In the next section we will see that ought has to be evaluated with respect to the 
local evaluation time to. If PASTl could shift to to the past, the sentence could 
mean that the student was obliged to study more at the time at which Bill had him. 
Thus we have to bar the LF (3-7a). The convention that does the job could be this: 
(3-8) The QR convention: The movement index created by QR is always 
different from the distinguished index O. 
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The IF (3-7b) violates the condition because the movement index is 0 there. On the 
other hand, an admissible LF would be this: 
(3-7) c. PAST} A.2[[a student that ought() to study more]3 T2 Bill have t.3] 
This correctly expresses that Bill's student has the obligation now. Returning to 
Abusch's example, let us apply the QR convention and let us suppose that we can 
apply Tense Deletion. We could derive the following LF then: 
(3-6) e. PAST} A.2[[a woman who 0-PAST be in the next room now]3 
T2 John meet 13] 
This LF would express an entirely consistent statement, namely that John met a 
woman who is in the next room now. In order to exclude the LF we can either say 
that a 0-tense has to be A.-bound or that Tense Deletion doesn't apply in extensional 
contexts. Thus, Abusch is right in saying that we should not allow the application 
of Tense Deletion in certain extensional contexts. The proper LF for the sentence 
(3-6a) should therefore be one with two coindexed PASTs. 
Another example showing that Ogihara's rule needs to be refined is this: 
(3-9) a. He has bought a fish that is alive 
b. PRES I HAVE Ao[pARTO he buy a fish that 0-PRES be alive] 
c. t\ 0 to 1\ 3t(1 < t\ 1\ 3x[fishw.,(x) 1\ alivewo' 1\ buywo,(he, x)] 
If PRES could be deleted here, we would expect the reading (3-9c) with a bound 
variable tense in the relative clause, which states that the fish was alive at the time of 
the buying. This reading is not attested. We could say that Tense Deletion cannot 
apply here because we have an extensional context. This, however, would not be 
entirely correct, because PAST can be deleted in this context as the following 
example shows: 
(3- 10) a. He has bought a fish that was alive 
b. PRES} HAVE Ao[pARTO he buy a fish that 0-PAST be alive] 
It is pretty clear what is going on here: HAVE may trigger PAST -deletion but it 
blocks PRES-deletion. Thus, it plays a similar role as to PAST, but it cannot be 
deleted itself. Ogihara's rule has to be modified to capture these facts. 
Before we try to state the rules which describe the distribution of bound 
tense in English, let us introduce some terminology. A tense is absolute or 
deic:tic if its evaluation argument denotes the time of utterance. In our system, the 
free variable to does the job. We call a tense bound in u iff its arguments are 
bound in a. Bound 0-tense is regarded as a special case thereof. A tense is free in 
a iff its arguments are not bound in u. Binding is to be understood in the sense of 
logic, i.e., a variable is bound by a quantifier or the A.-operator. 
Adopting the terminology of Abusch, let us call contexts in which we cannot 
have bound tenses extensional contexts. Second, there are contexts in which 
we can have bound tenses but which allow free tenses as well, for instance the 
contexts created by WOLL and HAVE. Let us call these contexts weak 
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intensional contexts. Third, there are the strong intensional contexts 
created by intensional predicates such as certain modals and verbs of attitude. In 
these contexts we cannot have free tenses. Henceforth, we will use the term 
intensional context in Abusch's sense, i .e., as a cover term for weak and strong 
intensional contexts. 
If I haven't overlooked something, the rules which describe the distribution 
of different interpretations of tenses in English are these: 
(3- 1 1 )  Tense Deletion in English (revised) 
a. No free tense in strong intensional contexts! 
b. PAST may be deleted if it is c-commanded by PAST and is not in an 
extensional context. 
c .  PRES may be deleted if it is  c-commanded by PRES , not c-
commanded by PAST or HA YE, and is not in an extensional context 
If we compare this system with Ogihara's analysis, we discover important empirical 
differences. Ogihara treats PAST and HAVE exactly alike, namely as time-shifters 
which can bind temporal variables. This is Montague's analysis. Abusch's data 
clearly show that we have to distinguish between tenses and auxiliaries: the former 
are not able to bind time variables in their c-command domain. Thus, tenses behave 
more like names, whereas auxiliaries behave like quantifiers. In our formalism, this 
has to be stipulated, because tenses could bind time variables. The other difference 
is principle (3- 1 1a), which I call Abnsch's constraint. This is not a syntactic 
principle but follows from semantic considerations as has been mentioned. 
The rule Tense Deletion accounts for bound variable tense, but not for 
bound tenses in general. We have to say something about bound relative 
tenses. Concerning bound relative PAST, I guess that it can occur in every tense 
deletion context. As for bound relative PRES, its distribution must be identical to 
the distribution of 0-PRES, because the two nearly mean the same. The following 
example illustrates the point. 
(3-12) a. Bill believed that Mary is pregnant 
b. PAST! Bill believe [).o that 3zlPRES2 Mary be pregnant]] 
The LF (3-12b) has a bound relati ve present in the that-clause. The sentence means 
that Bill believed that Mary was pregnant at a time overlapping his subjective now. 
The German counterpart of the sentence has that reading, but as a matter of fact the 
English sentence doesn't have it. Therefore, we have to restrict the occurrence of 
bound relative PRES for English. I will return to the question of what (3-12a) 
actually means in section 5. 
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4. Subjuuctive forms 
After having become acclimatized to the idea that finite forms may be 
interpreted as tenseless, i.e., as the bound distinguished variable to ' in certain 
contexts, it shouldn't come as a surprise that certain finite forms are always 
tenseless. Abusch ( 1993) observes that a number of English modals have that 
property, for instance ought and might. I will argue that this holds for subjunctive 
forms in general and that the said modals are best analysed as frozen subjunctive 
forms. The semantic effect of the subjunctive will be that it selects 0-tense, which 
is interpreted as the intensional parameter to ' 
Abusch ( 1993) gives the following examples, where the numbers in square 
brackets refer to her numbering. 
(4- 1) a. I ought to study more [A, 39] 
b.*When he � in high school, John ought to study more [A, 40] 
c. When he � in high school, John oUght to have studied more 
lA, 41] 
The comparison between (4- 1b) and (4- 1c) shows that semantically ought isn't a 
past form. The past role is played by ought to have. (4-1a) suggests that ought is a 
(semantic) present form, but the examples listed under (4-2) provide evidence that 
this cannot be correct either: 
(4-2) a. John believed that he ought to study more 
b. John believes that he ought to study more 
c. He will always be a student that oUght to work harder 
[Heim 1994, Fn. 22] 
[A, 45] 
If ought were a present form, (4-2a) would be ungrammatical by the rules of the 
sequence of tenses. (4-2b) and (4-2c) show that ought can be embedded under 
present and future, too. If we assume that ought is semantically tenseless, ought to 
study corresponds to the Latin infinitive present and ought to have studied 
corresponds to the Latin infinitive perfect. These forms have a bound variable 
reading and the distribution follows from what we have said about bound tense if 
we assume that ought can occur in a non-embedded position as well. Non-finite 
forms cannot occur there. The data show that there is no semantic reason for that. 
Therefore, there must be matrix sentences without semantic tense as witnessed by 
(4- 1a). This amounts to the same as if we had the present tense there. 
This is the idea behind Abusch's analysis of the behaviour of these modals, 
which goes like this: 
" ..• the temporal parameter of might and ought is treated as an IL-evaluation 
time" (Abusch 1993, p. 23) 
(IL is Richard Montague's language Intensional Logic.) What she means by this 
becomes clear if we have a look at the IL-formulas which formalize the sentences 
John ought to study more and John ought to have studied more. 
(4-3) a. [OUGHT'{study - more John]] 
b. H[ OUGHT"[ study - more John ] 
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H is Montague's PAST-operator. It expresses relative past: "there is a time before 
the evaluation time".5 Montague treats H as a logical symbol. Therefore, we find no 
up operator 1\ under H. 
We represent the intensional parameters by wo and to in the extensional 
language and thus obtain the following equivalent formulas, in which we use the 
auxiliary HAVE introduced in rule (3-4c) instead of Montague's H: 
(4-4) a. OUGHT.,OIO (AtoAW�studywolo (John)]) 
b. HAVEIo (Ato[ OUGHI'.,olo (AtoAWo[ studywolo (JOhn)]]) 
There is no semantic tense in these. Therefore, they can be embedded under an 
intensional predicate, and the intensional parameters are lambda-bound: 
(4-5) a. John believed he ought to study more 
(John, \ 
b. t1 < to A believe woll l AtOAWO[O UGHT.,olo ( AtoAWo[Studywolo (JOhn)])V 
As we have noted in the preceding section, Montague's analysis cannot be 
entirely correct because it yields the wrong reading for the sentence Bill had a 
student that ought to study more. We have to distinguish between HAVE and 
PAST. The former shifts the evaluation time to but the latter doesn't 
The observations made carry over to subjunctive forms in general. We 
know from the Latin examples that they cannot be interpreted as free tenses. I think 
the same is true for the subjunctive forms of English as well. In most cases, the 
subjunctive is identical with the simple past, but the auxiliary be shows that the 
distinction still exists to some extent. 
(4-6) If I were/?!lP:§. not in Austin, I would be in Prague 
The coexistence of the subjunctive and the indicative forms in this context shows to 
my mind that the latter is semantically a subjunctive. The data under (4-7) exhibit 
exactly the same grammaticality pattern as the examples (4-1). They show that the 
would in the consequent must be semantically tenseless and is perhaps best 
interpreted as a semantical subjunctive if the subjunctive is the operation deleting 
tense. 
(4-7) a. If Bill listened to you, he would make fewer mistakes 
b. *When Bill � in high school, he would make fewer mistakes if he 
listened to you 
c. When Bill !lP:§. in high school, he would have made fewer mistakes if 
he had listened to you 
As before, we can embed (4-7a) under past, present or future, provided the matrix 
predicate creates an intensional context in the sense of Abusch. 
(4-8) a. Mary believed that Bill would make fewer mistakes if he listened to 
you 
b. Mary believes that Bill would make fewer mistakes if he listened to 
you 
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c. Vashek will always be a dog that would make fewer mistakes if be 
listened to Zuzana. 
For convenience, I give an idea of what the LF for counterfactuals must be, here for 
a could-counterfactual. 
(4-9) a. If Vashek listened to me, he could make fewer mistakes 
b. A .. oto [listen ..... (Vashek )] 0 -..... A ..... [Zess ... ,. (Vashek)] 
The symbolism is an extensional version of Lewis' ( 1973) theory of counterfactuals 
and is interpreted as indicated there. 
In many other languages we find subjunctive forms at the place of the said 
English modals. Thus, it is tempting to regard these modals as frozen subjunctive 
forms. The hypothesis explaining the data would be that subjunctive forms don't 
have a semantic tense. 
One of the roles of the subjunctive seems to be that it deprives finite forms 
of their semantic tense. We can express this in the following way: 
(4-10) Subjunctive: 
The subjunctive morpheme (SUBJ) selects 0-tense. 
Recall that 0-tense is translated as t(). Since the subjunctive typically occurs in 
dependent clauses, t() will mostly be bound if we make the assumption that 
complementizers like if, (non-relative) that, etc. contain the variable binders AtoAWo 
(vide Heim 1994 for this assumption). Ignoring the AgrP, the if-clause in sentence 
(4-9a) would have an LF like the following one: 
(4- 1 1) [CP Ao if [ModP SUBJ [TP 0-PAST [VP Vashek listen to me]]]] 
To be sure, SUB] is an abstract morpheme which is morphologically realized only 
occasionally in contemporary English. 
5. The representation of double access 
Let us take up the question of what sentence (3- 12a), here repeated as 
(5- 1a), means in English. 
(5- 1)  a. Bill believed that Mary is pregnant 
This is the notorious double access phenomenon, which has troubled semanticists 
since the time when it was introduced into the theoretical discussion by Carlota 
Smith (vide Smith 1978). Usually, it is said that the sentence is true if Bill believed 
that Mary was pregnant and the pregnancy extends to the present time. Yet, as 
Abusch ( 1993) notices, this is not correct. Bill might very well have believed 
something wrong. The truth conditions of (5-1a) are better described by saying that 
the sentence is true if Bill believed that Mary was pregnant and the state which 
caused his belief extends to the present time. This state might not be pregnancy at 
all; it could be Mary's state of having a big belly (from overeating). 
Let us look at how Abusch ( 1993) derives that reading. We already know 
that PRES cannot be a part of the that-clause: PRES cannot be an absolute tense in 
view of Abusch's constraint, and it cannot be a bound tense according to the rules 
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describing the distribution of bound tenses. Abusch's way out is to interpret PRES 
de reo Her LF is something like ( 5-1 b). 
(5-1) b. PAST 1 Bill believe-of PRES2 A3Ao[f3 Mary be pregnant] 
Here, believe has an additional time argument. In order to make that clear, I have 
represented the verb as believe - 0/ . PRES2 may be thought of as moved from its 
basic position to the res-position by "res-movement" (vide Heim 1994). We first 
note that (5-1b) is not in conflict with Abusch's constraint: PRES2 is a free tense, 
but it is not in an intensional context. In the present theory the LF is, however, not 
well formed for type reasons: PRES2 is of the quantifier type, whereas the res­
position is of the individual type. It follows that PRES2 cannot remain there but has 
to be scoped over the matrix tense. The result is the LF (5-1c), whose interpretation 
is (5-1d). 
(5-1) c. PRES2 A4[PAST I Bill believe-of 14 A3Ao[f3 Mary be pregnant]] 
d .tz 0 to A t. < to A believe - O/wol' (Bill , tz ,A;AtoAwo[pregnantwot3 (Mary)] 
A de-re-attitude is interpreted by means of the methods developed in David Lewis 
( 1979). The subject of the attitude has to be acquainted with the res, here the time 
denoted by PRES2, i.e. g(t2), via an appropriate description, which is integrated 
into the content of the attitude. Thus, the content of Bill's belief might be something 
like: "This state of Mary's which I observe is pregnancy" .  A meaning rule for de­
re-belief might be something like this (cf. Heim 1994, 33): 
(5-2) lbelieve - o/ f(t ... "XR)(xXt)(w) is defined only if c supplies a suitable 
time-concept fc such that fc (w, t) = t ..... . 
Where defi n e d ,  lbelieve - o/ lr(t ... "XR)(xXt)(w) = 1  i ff 
R(/c(w' ,t )Xt)(w' ) - 1 for all w' and t ' compatible with x beliefs in 
w at t. 
As to the logical type of the symbol , since de-dicto-attitudes are of type 
{(i,st)(e, (i,st» ), de-re-symbols are of type {(i,(ii, st» (e, (i,st» ). 
To appreciate the merits of Abusch's solution, we compare it with a recent 
analysis due to Tim Stowell (cf. Stowell 1993). Stowell distinguishes between past 
morphology - represented as Past - and the semantic operation PAST. Similarly for 
Pres and PRES. He says that past morphology, i.e. Past, is like a negative polarity 
item insofar as it must be in the scope of the semantic past operator PAST. Present 
morphology behaves like a positive polarity item with respect to PAST: it must not 
occur in the scope of PAST. 
(5-3) Stowell 's  (1993) tense polarity 
a. Past morphology can only appear in the scope of (semantic) PAST at 
LF. 
b. Pres( ent) morphology must not appear in the scope of PAST at LF. 
Thus, one semantic tense may license several tense morphologies without semantic 
tense. The idea is, of course, that a tense morphology without immediately adjacent 
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semantic tense is not interpreted as semantic tense. Obviously, the principles are 
rather similar to the rule of Tense Deletion (3-1 1). 
How is tense morphology without semantic tense interpreted? Stowell's 
semantic remarks are somewhat sketchy. From what I have understood, a 0-tense 
can be regarded as a variable which is coindexed with the nearest c-commanding 
semantic tense.6 
We are ready for Stowell's analysis of the double access phenomenon now. 
As before, the D-structure (5-48) cannot be well formed, because Pres is in the 
scope of PAST. 
(5-4) a. Bill PAST believe-Past that Mary PRES be-Pres pregnant 
Therefore, Stowell scopes the embedded clause over the matrix clause and obtains 
the LF (5-4b)? 
(5-4) b. [PRES2 Mary be-Pres pregnant]3 
PASTI Bill believe-Past [ 0-PRES Mary be-0-Pres pregnant13 
The scoping process leaves an identical copy with deleted PRES and, as Musan 
( 1994) notices, Pres should be deleted as well . Otherwise the tense polarity 
condition (5-3b) would be violated. Stowell is not explicit on the principles which 
trigger these deletions. So let us assume that we delete everything which violates 
grammatical conditions of well-formedness. The next question concerns the 
interpretation of the seoping process. The standard interpretation by means of 
A.-abstraction is not possible because the copy left obviously cannot be interpreted 
as a bound variable. The only way to make sense of the LF which I can see is to 
interpret this scoping process as conjunction, though the details are not clear to me. 
Under these assumptions, the LF means this: 
(5-4) 
rt2 0 to A pregnantwo':t (Mary) A 1 
c
' ltl < to A believewot, (Bill,AtoAwo[ pregnantwo" (Mary)])] 
This reading is inadequate for several reasons. First, it does not guarantee that we 
are speaking about the same pregnancy. Stowell's LF means: "Mary is pregnant 
and Bill believed that Mary was pregnant at the time of the believing". Clearly, the 
pregnancies can be different ones. Second, the interpretation predicts that the 
complement of the sentence necessarily has a factive understanding. We have 
noticed that this need not be so. Bill might have a wrong belief about Mary's state. 
Third, we have a temporal anaphor in the intensional argument, a violation of 
Abusch's constraint. If this is the semantics for Stowell's analysis,  then the 
proposal must be wrong. 
A similar objection applies to En�'s (1987) solution of the phenomenon. 
Her LF is something like this: 
(5-5) [COMPo,k PRESo,k Mary be pregnant]i PASTj,k Bill believe Ii 
Again, I am not sure how the seoping of the CP is interpreted. If the interpretation 
is non-factive, the intended reading can be paraphrased as: "Bill believes at time tj, 
tj < to, that Mary is pregnant at time 10, where tj is included in 10". Never mind how 
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we obtain this interpretation from the LF, it cannot be correct anyway since the 
complement of attitude contains a free tense. The analysis is doomed to failure by 
Abusch's constraint. 
None of these objections applies to Abusch's solution. Therefore, I take it 
her approach is more successful than its rivals. 
6. Tense and temporal adverbs of quantification 
Let us come back to the problem of combining tense with (temporal) 
adverbs of quantification. I think the key for a correct treatment is still Kratzer's 
( 1978) definite theory of tense, according to which PAST denotes the maximal 
time stretch before the speech time. In extensional terms, Kratzer's semantics may 
be stated as follows: 
(6-1) I PAST KpXt) =  1 iff (P)(f ) = 1 ,  where t' is the maximal subinterval of t 
which is before to. 
If t is today, then PAST(P)(t) is true iff P is true of the time within today which is 
before the speech time. The adverb always quantifies over every subinterval of that 
time. This account gives us the correct truth-conditions. 
I would like to incorporate this semantics into the relational approach I was 
using in the previous sections. This is not entirely straightforward because the 
temporal parameters play different roles in Kratzer's and our systems. The variable 
t in Kratzer's rule is the intensional parameter and corresponds to our evaluation 
time. At the same time, t plays the role of what Bauerle ( 1979) calls Betrachtzeit, 
"temporal frame", which is the time determined by frame-setters like today. It 
corresponds to our reference time. to is the unshiftable time of utterance. In our 
system, the local evaluation time is expressed by the shiftable parameter to. Since 
the reference time is the maximal time before to within Bauerle's temporal frame, 
we have to introduce a further temporal parameter for the frame, which we may call 
frame time. This parameter can be shifted by a frame-setter like today. The logical 
forms for PAST and PRES are now these: 
(6-2) Tenses (official version) 
a. PASTG)i is translated as AI{ PAST(to)(tj Xl;) A P(t J] . 
IpASTkk)(jXi) = 1 iff i = the maximal t, such that t !:j and t is before 
k .  
b. PRESG)i i s  translated as AI{PRES(toXtJtJ A p(tj )] . 
I PRES � k )(jX I) = 1 iff i = the maximal t, such that t !:j and t overlaps 
k .  
To illustrate the terminology once more: 1i denotes the reference time, y the frame 
time, and to denotes the local evaluation time. We can now represent Partee's 
sentence (1-5) as: 
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(6-3) PAST(1)2 1..3 [oot T3 I tum off the stove] 
PAST(to)(tl Xt2 ) " -{turn - offwol2 (1, s)] 
iff � '" MAX,[t � tl " t < to] " ... [ turn - off ... or. (I, s)] 
In this case, both the frame time tl and the evaluation time t2 have to be determined 
by the context, i .e., by a contextually given variable assignment gc ' The situation 
changes with an overt frame-setter like yesterday: then, the most natural reading of 
the sentence is that I didn't tum off the stove for the whole of yesterday: 
(6-4) Yesterday 1..1 [pASf(1)2 1..3[not T3 I tum off the stove]] 
t2 - MAX,[t � yesterday " t < to] " ... [ turn - offwoI2 ( 1,  .�)] 
iff ... [ turn - off ... ."...-..JI,s)] 
We are finally ready for an analysis of the puzzling sentence ( l - 13a). 
Consider the simpler variant (6-Sa) first, where the adverb of quantification is not 
overtly restricted: 
(6-5) a. Today, Vashek is always funny 
b. Today I..l [PRES(1)2 A.3[alwaYS(3) Vashek be funny]) 
12 = MAX,[t � today " t o 10] " V{t � t2 - funny ... or <Va�hek)] 
Here, 0 is the frame variable of the quantifier always, whose meaning is: 
(6-6) always is a symbol of type (i,« i, t), t» .  
I always Kt )(p) ... 1 iff for each t': if t' is a subinterval of t, then p(t ) - l. 
Next, consider (1- 13a), here repeated as (6-7a). We want this to express the 
reading represented by the formula (6-7b): 
(6-7) a. Today, Vashek always barks when the bell rings 
r� -= MAX.[I� today A I 0 to] 1 
b ' l " Vt[t � � " ring"'o.(the bell) - barkwo. (Vashek)]J 
The formula illustrates what we have observed in section I :  the when-clause must 
not contain an absolute present; otherwise we would obtain a wrong reading, for in 
the absolute interpretation always cannot bind a variable in the antecedent and the 
sentence is therefore out. Hence, this occurrence of the present morpheme must 
express a bound variable reading. Since the PRES in the whe7H:lause can undergo 
Tense Deletion, we can generate an appropriate LF: 
(6-7) c. today 1..1[PRES( 1)2 1..3[ALWAYS(3) 
Aij(wheno Ao£0-PRES the bell ring]) Vashek baric.]] 
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The formula shows that we are assuming that ALWAYS(3) creates a tense deletion 
context. As for the conjunction when, I will assume a very trivial semantics, 
namely "being a time at which": 
(6-8) when is of type (i,({i,t}, t» .  I whenlJ(t)(P) = 1 iff P(1) = 1 . 
Thus, Ao[wheno Ao[0-PRES the bell ring]] expresses the property "being a time at 
which the bell rings" . ALWAYS is a two-place quantifier which takes a restricting 
clause in addition to the frame variable: 
(6-9) ALWAYS is of type (i,« i, 1), ({i, 1), 1» ) . 
I ALWAYSll tXp)(Q) = 1 iff for every t': if t' is a subinterval of t and 
P(f ) = 1 , then Q(f) = 1 .  
Obviously, always and ALWAYS are instances of a more general schema, but I am 
neglecting this issue. Given all this, we can translate the LF (6-7c) into a logical 
formula which expresses the desired reading: 
(6-7) 
rpRES(tO)(tl )(t2 )  1 
d. }.JI l { }.Jo[ when(to )(}.Jo.ringw • ( the bell})' \ II( today) A ALWAY5(;)l · · .1' 1  l }.Jo[bar/c,. ••• (Vashek)] J J 
The reader may convince himself that this is equivalent to (6-7b). I expect the 
approach to be applicable to constructions with after and before: as well: 
(6-10) a. Vashek is always happy immediately after a walk 
b. Vashek is always very impatient before we go out for a walk 
c. This afternoon, Vashek ran away before anyone could catch him 
We have to say that "t afterlbefore P" means that t is a time afterlbefore a time which 
is P. This meaning is very weak. Therefore, we mostly have to assume additional 
modifiers like immediately or five minutes which qualify the distance between t and 
the next P-time. Some of these may be invisible at the surface. Before-adverbials 
bring further complications, since the complement may be modalized and license 
negative polarity items. It is rather obvious that this has to do with a merely 
possible future as opposed to a real future. This belongs to the complex of 
"prospective" aspect. a topic not treated in this paper. 
In section 3, I analysed the auxiliary stem WOLL as "there is a time after". 
The following sentences show that this is not general enough. 
(6-1 1) a. Zuzana said that Vashek would always be funny 
b. Zuzana said that Vashek would always be a dog that would make 
fewer mistakes if he listened to Vladimir 
To obtain the correct readings, WOLI.-(j)i must give us the maximal subinterval i of 
j which is after 0: 
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(6-12) IWOL4k)UXi) = 1 iff i is the maximal time t such that t is a subintetval of j 
and t is after Ie. 
Using the same abbreviation conventions as before, the LF for (6-1 1a) is (6- 1 1  a 1) 
and (6-1 1az) is the interpretation: 
(6- 1 1 )  al . PAST(2)1 A-33(3)4[Zuzana say 
i.o35[0-PAST WOLL(6)5 Ao[alwayS(o) Vashek be funny]]] 
a2· 
ft, = MAX,[t � t2 1\ t < to] 1 1 rt4 � t, 1 1 : 1\ 3t4 1 ( rt5 = MAX,[t � t6 I\ t > tO] 1\ 1 : l 1 1\ say." 1 Zuzana.AtoAw03ts l [ �JJ I J l 0 "  1\ 'lit t C ts - junnY"'o,(Vashek}J J 
3(3)4 is the invisible adverb of quantification "at some time t4 which is a 
subinterval of the frame time t3". Bauerle ( 1979) introduced such invisible temporal 
adverbs of quantification. The frame variables 2 and 6 are left free and get their 
value from the context. A good value for 6 would be the entire time. 
I have analysed WOLL entirely parallel to tenses, i.e., I am assuming that 
auxiliaries have a referential argument, here 5. (The auxiliary HAVE has an 
analogue semantics, of course.) This requires the closure of the variable by a 
quantifier, here the invisible existential quantifier. 
Sentence ( 6- 1 1  b) can be analysed along the same lines. The result will be a 
rather complicated LF, whose elaboration I leave to the reader. 
7. Bound variable tense and frame-setting temporal adverbs 
Frame-setting adverbs like today, yesterday or on Monday provide some 
evidence that our analysis of "bound variable tense" as a bound variable is too 
simple. Presumably we have to choose the relative present instead. 
Recall that the strongest principle defended in this paper is Abusch's 
constraint, i.e., the claim that there cannot be an absolute tense in a strong 
intensional context. One would like to deduce this principle from a more general 
principle such as: 
(7- 1) No direct reference in strong intensional contexts!S 
Direct reference is understood in the sense of Kaplan ( 1977) as covering deictics 
and bound individual variables. This rather sweeping claim is at variance with a 
huge amount of theoretic literature on deictics in intensional contexts, notably with 
what has been said on double indexing (e.g. Kamp 1971). Nevertheless, I guess 
that the principle is correct for the reason that we must know the essence of a thing 
in order to have it as a part of the content of an attitude (vide, e.g., Lewis 1979). 
The principle entails that many standard analyses have to be revised. 
Consider for instance the following contrast noted in Klein (1994, p. 173). 
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(7-2) a. *Amim seems to sleep yesterday 
b. Amim seems to have slept yesterday 
If principle (7-1 )  were not valid, (7-2a) would be acceptable and express a 
proposition like: "In every world w and every time t which are compatible with 
everything which seems to be the case in the real world wo at the present time 10, 
Amim sleeps at w on the day before the day containing 10". Klein's solution is that 
the matrix verb projects its evaluation time (his "topic time") into the embedded 
infinitival. Then the non-fInite verb is evaluated at the present time and we obtain a 
conflict with the meaning of yesterday. 
This rather obvious solution is not compatible with principle (7-1) ,  and it 
contradicts the observation made in section 1 that there is no connection between the 
evaluation time of the matrix verb and the evaluation time of the embedded verb in 
an intensional context. We therefore have to fInd another explanation for the 
contrast. I would like to indicate a possible solution by discussing a somewhat 
different example involving the future which shows a similar contrast: 
(7-3) a. *Three days ago Sue believed that she was sick today 
b. Three days ago Sue believed that she would be sick today 
Three days ago Sue said to herself: "In three days I will be sick" . She did not have 
a particular day in mind because she did not even know which day it was. 
Nevertheless, we describe her attitude by means of (7 -3b). Let us complicate things 
slightly: I uttered (7-3b) on Monday, and today is Tuesday. In this scenario, I can 
describe Sue's attitude by means of (7-4)(a) or (b): 
(7-4) a. Four days ago Sue believed that she would be sick (*was sick) 
yesterday 
b. Four days ago Sue believed that she would be sick (*was sick) on 
Monday 
Thus, the that-clauses in (7-3b) and (7-4)(a) and (b) all describe Sue's content of 
belief: "In three days I will be sick". How could that be? None of the clauses 
contains the temporal description in three days. We fmd today, yesterday and on 
Monday instead. These are obviously our way of describing Sue's "in three days" . 
The only method I am aware of which can cope with these fIndings is a de 
re analysis: Sue believed of today/yesterday/Monday under the description "three 
days after the day at which I am" that she would be sick. 
Thus, the relevant LF for (7-3b) is perhaps (7-3bI >, and the formula 
interpreting it is below: 
(7-3) bl .  PAST(2)1 Sue believe-of today 
A3Ao[t3 A43S[0-PAST WOLL(4)S Ao[lNFO she be sick]]] 
( Sue, today , \ PASr(tOXt2X� ) 1\ believe - o!..." l  rwOLI.(to)(�Xts )l 1 �AtoAwo3ts l l\ sick.,.,. (she) j) 
The formula is true if there is a relation of acquaintance R which uniquely connects 
Sue in wo at 10 with today and Sue believes of being R-related to a unique time at 
which she will be sick. In this particular case, R is the function "three days after the 
time at which l am" , i.e., R(t) is the third day after the day containing t. In the 
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scenario assumed for (7-3bl), R(g(tJ) = �odayl , because �odayl is the third day 
after the day containing g(� ) .  Let us abbreviate R(t) as "3rd-after(t)" .  Then the 
content of belief can be represented by the formula: 
The formula expresses the property of being sick on the third day after the 
subjective now. This is the correct result.9 
Next, let us turn to sentence (7-3a). Here we have the problem that we don't 
know what the LF should be because the frame-setter today has to bind a frame 
variable, but there is none if we interpret the bound PAST as a bound variable 
simpliCiter. The assumption that the temporal abstract applies to the frame-setter in 
this case does not help either, because we obtain a consistent content of belief in 
such a case. Thus, if we assumed that (7-3a) had the LF (7-3a1), the content of 
belief would be (7-3a2): 
(7-3) al . PAST(2)1 Sue believe-of today A.3Ao[t3 Ao[0-PAST she be sick]] 
a2· A.toi..w� sickW03rd_crfterf.ro)  (She)] 
The only way out of the dilemma which I can imagine is to say that bound variable 
tense expresses a bound relative present (cf. von Stechow 1991). If this is correct, 
the proper LF for (7-3a) is (7-3a3), where 0-PAST(4)5 is interpreted as if it were 
PRES(4)5-
(7-3) a3. PAST(2) 1 Sue believe-of today A.3A.o[t3 A.435[0-PAST(4)5 she be 
sick]] 
If we evaluate the formula translating this LF with respect to the aforementioned 
function R, we obtain: 
(7-3) 84. 
Clearly the restriction for the bound present t o to 1\ t k 3rd - after(to ) is 
inconsistent, and this explains the oddness of the example. 
We could use the notation PRES( 4)5 instead of 0-PAST (4)5 if we wanted. 
This might, however, give the wrong impression that this bound relative present is 
the translation of a surface present This is not so. A surface present in that position 
cannot be interpreted as a bound relative present My notation is reminiscent of this 
somewhat paradoxical situation, which is typical for English. 
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It follows that we have to replace all the occurrences of bound variable tense 
by the more complicated symbol expressing bound relative present. For instance, 
the revised LF for (7-3b) is: 
(7-3) b3. PAST(2)1  Sue believe-of today 
A3Ao[t.3 A43s36[0-PAST(O)5 WOlL(4)6 Ao[lNFO she be sick}]] 
To convince yourself that this gives us the same result as before, consider the 
translation of Ao35[0-PAST(O)5 ... ]. It is AtoAw03ts[ts = MAXt(t 0 to A t � to ) . . .] . 
This is equivalent to AtoAWo[" .to • •  '] ' Thus, this version of bound present encodes 
the bound variable reading. 
Finally, let us return to Klein's examples (7-2). We can get the contrast only 
if we assume that the embedded infinitival contains a relative present. The most 
natural place for the localization of this information is presumably the INFL-node 
to. Thus, an LF for the unacceptable (7-2a) is: 
(7-2) al . PRES(2)1 seem-of yesterday 
A3J.o[t.3 1435[t<rPRES(4)5 Arnim sleep}] 
Let us assume that the relation of acquaintance for the impersonal attitude "seem" is 
"the day which is before the day of the utterance". We abbreviate this as " 1st 
b e fo r e ( t O ) " .  T hen PRES(4)5 expre s s e s  the i nformat i o n  
ts = MAXt[t 0 to A t � 1st - bejore(to )] . This i s  inconsistent and therefore explains 
the oddness of (7-2a). 
Endnotes 
lFor a recent discussion of the merits and problematic aspects of En�'s theory, vide 
Zeller ( 1994, 33). 
2As far as I know, examples of this kind were ftrst noted by Lee Baker. In Baker 
( 1989/95), chapter 17, we find the example (76a) Phyllis wanted to tell Arthur that 
[John didn 't think that he would ever find out whether anyone knew when his 
baggage would arrive]. The rule which accounts for the "unexpected" dependent 
past forms is the Past Harmony Rule on page 546 of the second edition. Ogihara's 
Tense Deletion may be regarded as a formalization of this rule. 
3Dowty ( 1982) discusses the structurally identical John will find a unicorn that Y. 
walking. 
4()gihara interprets 0-tense as the relative present , which is the identical function in 
his system. This has the effect that a statement of the form 3t[pRES(t) & AT(t, a.)] 
means the same as the tenseless statement a.. 
SNote, incidentally, that the formulas show that the English surface syntax is 
idiosyncratic here. Ought should be embedded under have, as it is in German or 
Italian. Thus, this construction cannot be interpreted compositionally. 
6f'or a careful exegesis of Stowell's work, vide Zeller ( 1994). 
7Stowell's LF is actually more complicated, namely something like: Ho eo Mary be 
pregnant [3ei PROO PAST ej Bill believe [Hi ej Mary be pregnantJ]. From what I 
have understood this can be paraphrased as "At the present time eo we have a state 
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of Mary's pregnancy and there is an eventlstate ei which is before eo which is a 
belief of Bill that a state of Mary's pregnancy holds at the time of ef'. 
8'fhere are several passages in Abusch ( 1993) which suggest that she has this 
generalization in mind. 
9'fo my mind, this and the related examples show that Abusch's ( 1993) claim that 
one cannot be acquainted with a future time for epistemological reasons cannot be 
correct. 
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